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Eavesdropping on Blind Quantum Key Distribution
through a Labeling Attack
Marco Lucamarini
Dipartimento di Fisica, Universita` di Camerino, I-62032 Camerino, Italy
I present an eavesdropping on the protocol proposed by W.-H. Kye, et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 95,
040501 (2005)]. I show how an undetectable Eve can steal the whole information by labeling and
then measuring the photons prepared by the user Alice.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
In Ref. [1] it is described a novel three-way protocol
for quantum key distribution, defined “blind” because
it does not require the public revelation of the polar-
ization bases; let me call it for ease KKKP, after the
names of its inventors. One nice feature of KKKP is
that the “control mode” present in Ping-Pong-like pro-
tocols is not necessary, because of the randomness of the
traveling photons polarization. Unfortunately this same
feature makes KKKP vulnerable to a number of attacks
by an eavesdropper (Eve) whose aim is to steal infor-
mation from Alice and Bob. As a consequence KKKP
experienced a series of modifications [1, 2, 3] in order
to improve its security without changing the philosophy
of the scheme: the Impersonation attack [4] is avoided
through the preparation of two pulses on Alice side fol-
lowed, at a proper time, by a random blocking of one of
the two, and through the addition of a random parameter
on Bob side, the ‘shuffling factor’ s [1]. Notwithstanding,
these changes alone are not sufficient to avert the attack,
as noticed in [5], and it was necessary to double the shuf-
fling parameter in two, the shufflings s1 and s2 [3]. Fi-
nally, an eavesdropping resulting from the combination
of Invisible-photon attack [6] and the PNS attack [7] can
be avoided through a random check of the intensities of
the beams by Alice and/or Bob [1, 2].
In this Comment I show that despite the above mod-
ifications KKKP can still be attacked successfully with-
out risk of detection. The main tool at Eve’s disposal is
what I call a “labeling-and-measure” strategy. It can be
thought as a small shift of one of the involved photons’
degree of freedom, like the wavelength for instance, in a
way similar to what proposed by Cai in [6]. This makes
the photons distinguishable to Eve, who can thus mea-
sure the relevant parameters of the communication.
In the three-way KKKP Alice prepares a photon in
a polarization state |ψ1〉 = cos θ |0〉 − sin θ |1〉, choosing
randomly the angle θ. Bob rotates the polarization of
the received photon by applying the unitary operator
Ûy(φ) = cosφÎ − i sinφσ̂y , with φ randomly chosen as
well; then returns the photon to Alice. Alice applies the
transformation Ûy(−θ+(−1)
k
pi/4) to the photon, where
k = 0, 1, thus removing the protection θ from the state,
and encoding on it the key ‘k’. In this way Bob, af-
ter compensating for his angle φ, can deterministically
infer the key. In the stronger version of KKKP Alice
sends two photons to Bob, with independent angles θ1
and θ2. Bob executes Ûy(φ+(−1)
s1 pi/4) on the first and
Ûy(φ + (−1)
s2 pi/4) on the second, and returns them to
Alice. Alice adds the key as before, but she also blocks
one of the two pulses according to the value 0 or 1 of the
‘blocking factor’ b. Then, after removing any temporal
label from the resulting photon, she forwards it to Bob,
who measures it as before. Afterward, Alice’s public dis-
closure of b allows Bob to reconstruct the key. To this
stronger version of KKKP I add also the random con-
trol on the intensity of the beams during the protocol,
by Alice and/or Bob, and call this final version KKKP.
Now I describe the label-and-measure eavesdropping
on KKKP. For explicative purposes the label I use is the
wavelength of the photons. However any other degree of
freedom different from the polarization (e.g. the momen-
tum direction, an eventual phase respect to a reference
signal, the temporal distribution, etc.) can be used as a
label by Eve, and constitutes a loophole of the protocol.
Let us suppose, like in the Impersonation attack, that
there are Eve1, who impersonates Bob to Alice, and
Eve2, who impersonates Alice to Bob. The hard work
is made by Eve1, who steals both the key k and the
block factor b from Alice. In KKKP Alice sends out the
pulses θ1 and θ2 at a certain wavelength λ. Eve1 chooses
randomly one of the two photons, say the first one (p1),
and shifts its wavelength into λ1 = λ + δ, while leav-
ing the second (p2) unchanged. δ is a quantity different
from zero whose smallness depends on Eve1’s technology,
which one must assume to be infinite, or at least greater
than Alice and Bob’s one. According to the protocol, Al-
ice performs the operations Ûy(−θ1 + (−1)
k
pi/4) on p1
and Ûy(−θ2 + (−1)
k pi/4) on p2. Then she blocks one of
the two photons, say p2, and forwards p1, after delaying
it properly to make it undistinguishable in time from p2.
It is straightforward to see that from Alice side exits only
p1 in the state:
|ξ〉 =
∣∣∣(−1)k pi/4, λ1
〉
p1
, (1)
where the wavelength is indicated together with the po-
larization state. Note that the protection θ1 has been
removed from p1 by Alice through her last transforma-
tions. By measuring the wavelength and the polarization
of the photon in the state (1) Eve1 can infer which pulse
was blocked, i.e. the blocking factor b, and the value of
2k. These two values are accordingly used by Eve2 on a
pair of fake pulses sent to Bob, in order to mimic to him
the presence of Alice. Since the imitation is perfect Bob
has no chance to unveil the attack. Let me point out that
although I described the eavesdropping as two separate
temporal sequences it is on the contrary important that
Eve1 and Eve2 act in synchronization in the following
way:
1. Eve1 modifies p1 and stores p1 and p2
2. Eve2 sends a pair of fake pulses to Bob
3. when Eve2 receives back the two fake pulses from Bob
Eve1 forwards to Alice the two photons she stored
4. ...and so on.
This makes the usage of public receipts of the photons by
Alice and Bob ineffective against Eve. Finally, a control
of the intensity of the beams is clearly useless in this case
since the intensity is not altered by Eve.
In conclusion I showed an explicit label-and-measure
eavesdropping against the stronger version of the KKKP
protocol [1], illustrated by a simple wavelength shift of
one of the photons prepared by Alice. This attack pro-
vides Eve with a complete knowledge of the exchanged
information, without the possibility by Alice and Bob of
detect her presence. The insertion of (wavelength) fil-
ters in analogy with what proposed in [6] does not work
in this case because there is no polarization detections
during the protocol. Nevertheless, the introduction of
polarization controls along the channels of KKKP is not
simple, just because of the randomness of the polariza-
tion bases.
The solution of the problem should include the Alice
removal of all potential Eve’s labels. Perhaps Alice could
use the teleportation process to transfer the polarization
state of the unblocked photon on another photon whose
degrees of freedom are not controlled by Eve. Despite its
practical difficulty this solution seems to be not outside
the range of current technology.
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